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Examining hidden coercion at state
borders: why carrier sanctions cannot
be justified
Tendayi Bloom1* and Verena Risse2
1United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility
(UNU-GCM), Barcelona, Spain; 2Philosophy Department, Goethe University,
Frankfurt, Germany
Abstract
Sanctions placed upon airlines and other operators transporting persons without the required
paperwork are called ‘carrier sanctions’. They constitute a key example of how border control
mechanisms are currently being outsourced, privatized, delegated, and moved from the border
itself to new physical locations. These practices can lead to a phenomenon referred to in this paper
as ‘hidden coercion’. This paper argues that, while hidden coercion is commonplace in the reality
of migration policy in most states, it is so far neglected in theoretical discussions of state coercion.
Moreover, the discussion of carrier sanctions demonstrates that this neglect is problematic, since
hidden coercion is not justifiable even within a framework that legitimizes state border coercion.
Keywords: coercion; carrier sanctions; border control; justice; immigration
‘Carrier Sanctions’ are those sanctions placed upon airlines and other operators trans-
porting persons without the required paperwork. This paper argues that they con-
stitute a form of what will be called ‘hidden coercion’, which is not justifiable, even
within a framework that generally legitimizes state border coercion. At the heart of
border control lies a specifically directed kind of state coercion. By outsourcing and
delegating it to different agents (both private and public) operating in a variety of
locations (inside and outside state as well as at the border), it becomes difficult to
isolate the agents and objects of the coercion. Moreover, as coercion is dissipated, it
becomes hidden and thereby also unscrutinized.
These instances of hidden coercion, it will be argued, are problematic for
practical, legal, and moral reasons, so that the normative problem raised is not
only a philosophical puzzle but also an urgent matter to be addressed. Conversely,
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understanding how this normative problematic works can help to explain how to
move towards improving legal responses.
This paper begins by noting the sorts of liberal justifications usually offered for
border control and other forms of state-based coercion, as well as sketching some
of the debate surrounding them that has been recently revived by the discussion
between David Miller and Arash Abizadeh. It then goes on to define what will be
referred to in this paper as ‘hidden coercion’, presenting two dimensions of this
hiddenness: its ambiguous location, and its delegation. In a next step, this will be
illustrated by a key example, the case of carrier sanctions. After revisiting and
reinforcing practical and legal problems with carrier sanctions which tend to be
neglected in the theoretical debate, this paper explores a new notion of ‘hidden
coercion’, as a normative problem that should not be ignored, even within a liberal
theoretical framework that justifies substantial border control.
STATE BORDER COERCION
Coercion at a state’s border and coercion within the state are different: They differ
with regard to the eligible coercees, the function, the type of justification offered and
the normative implications. This section analyzes these differences by: (1) offering a
general definition of coercion; (2) analyzing state coercion; and (3) introducing the
specific case of border coercion.
Contemporary discussions of coercion arguably began with the work of Robert
Nozick and Gerald Dworkin in the 1960s. For Nozick, coercion requires that there
be a coercer and a coercee, and that the coercer both aims and succeeds in keeping
the coercee from choosing some action, A. The coercer does this through making it
known to the coercee that the coercer will make doing A less desirable than not
doing A.1 While Nozick provides an analytical definition of how coercion functions,
Dworkin emphasizes the involuntary character of actions performed under coercion
by considering that ‘whenever coercion takes place, one will is subordinated to the
other. The coerced is no longer a completely independent agent’.2 This also implies
that coercion interferes with the core liberal values of liberty and autonomy which
rely on an independence from any obstruction. Although most elements of Nozick’s
definition have been contested in one way or another,3 the core of his account still
forms the status quo of what can be regarded as a general understanding of coercion.
This paper adopts Nozick’s approach as a working definition, such that: coercion
successfully takes place when one agent intentionally makes another agent perform
an action against her will. Two additional aspects should be noted. First, the
definition also applies to negative action (such as the action of not doing A). For
example, a highwayman could either demand ‘Your money or your life!’ or only ask
the driver not to go where she had intended. An agent can, then, be coerced either to
perform or to refrain from an action. Further, this theory posits that coercion can
operate through either threats alone or threats backed by physical force.
Internal state coercion operates according to this mechanism, threatening unfavor-
able consequences to compel someone to act in a desired way. Drivers, for instance,
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are more likely to respect the speed limit when they know that violating it will incur a
fine. State coercion differs from the general kind of coercion described above in two
respects. First, it is institutionally different in that coercive power is concentrated,
that is monopolized, in the state, from where it can potentially simultaneously reach
more coercees. Second, state coercion is exercised through state institutions or
officers that are specifically so-authorized.
Since, as it was said, coercion conflicts with values such as autonomy and liberty,
demands of justification arise. The common liberal stand on this demand is well
summarized by Christopher J. Eberle who argues that:
[T]he claim that respect requires public justification provides a basis for the central
component of the justificatory liberal’s ethic of citizenship: the norm of respect
imposes an obligation on each citizen to discipline herself in such a way that she
resolutely refrains from supporting any coercive law for which she cannot provide
the requisite public justification.4
The centrality of this position has recently become visible in the debate on global
justice, i.e. the question of whether duties of justice only hold among co-nationals or
whether they also apply vis-a`-vis foreigners. In this context, authors such as Michael
Blake and Thomas Nagel claim that only relationships marked by state coercion
can possibly ground duties of justice between individuals.5 This argument has led to
a wave of criticisms. In particular, authors like Arash Abizadeh have argued that
relying on the claim that state coercion triggers justification toward those at its target
commits Blake to accepting that those demands arise equally when coercion is
exercised at the state border.6
Border coercion is different from internal state coercion. It is a complex sort of
coercion with a different scope and a different aim, and its legitimacy is harder to
establish than internal state coercion. While classic contemporary liberal political
theory had assumed the legitimacy of border coercion, this position has been
problematized especially in Joseph Carens’ 1987 article, Aliens and Citizens: The Case
for Open Borders and Phillip Cole’s 2000 book, Philosophies of Exclusion.7 Cole argues
that if liberal political theory is unable to make sense of the border, or at least
acknowledge its illegitimacy, the project of liberal theory has failed. Carens argues
more positively, that by valuing freedom of movement, three important schools of
political theoretic thought (Rawlsianism, Utilitarianism and Nozickian Libertarian-
ism) must all conclude in favor, at least in theory, of open borders if they take
their own principles seriously. Both Cole and Carens (and a number of other
contemporary authors) contend that border control cannot be justified in the same
way as coercion within the state. This is both because of problems of scope (in
particular, those coerced by the external border of the state are not within the scope
of the legitimizing demos) and because there are some accepted anomalies at the
border that would not be acceptable at the state level. For example, it is usually
assumed that certain categories of persons are not proper subjects of border coercion
(namely, citizens of that state, as well as some other groups). These arguments have
been made by key writers in this area, from Phillip Cole8 to the more recent analysis
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by Bas Schotel. Schotel argues that it is exclusion (and so border coercion) that
needs to be justified, rather than the usual approach of assuming exclusion.9 This
paper acknowledges this problem.
The use of the lens of coercion to analyze the legitimacy of border control has been
taken up again in a recent debate between David Miller and Arash Abizadeh,10 with
Abizadeh arguing that democratic justification usually chosen as the way out of the
liberal legitimacy deadlock also fails to justify border control since:
democratic theory either rejects the unilateral right to close borders, or would
permit such a right only derivatively and only if it has already been successfully and
democratically justified to foreigners. This is because the demos of democratic
theory is in principle unbounded, and the regime of boundary control must
consequently be democratically justified to foreigners as well as to citizens.11
That is, the coercees (i.e. the would-be-immigrants) have no chance to take part in
any justification process.12 Miller disagrees, claiming that border coercion does not
constitute coercion at all and does not pose a threat to autonomy, so that there is no
need to offer a justification to the would-be-immigrants. His argument is based on a
distinction between coercion and prevention. Prevention, on his definition, rules out
one option only from a set of options, while coercion forces someone into a specific
action.13 Border control itself is not, for him, coercive, but generally preventive and
therefore does not threaten autonomy and, consequently, does not trigger a need
for justification. Although intuitively appealing, it quickly appears that what Miller
characterizes as prevention includes many cases that are ordinarily regarded as
instances of coercion. A case in point would be a police barrier blocking one
motorway exit.
Moreover, prevention does form a conceptual part of coercion for a relevant group
of coercion theorists in the sense that the ‘inducement to perform specific acts
typically follows on the ability to prevent many or even all other acts’.14 This means
that for these theorists prevention constitutes the primary way in which coercion
functions. Preventing a person from taking the relevant alternatives to the desired
course of action in this sense of prevention usually entails the power to shape and
define the institutional context of the coercee15 and can be imagined like a path
where all branch-offs are blocked. In sum, it appears that, whatever understanding
one adopts, Miller’s distinction between coercion and prevention is hard to sustain.
Abizadeh himself acknowledges the limits of his account. In particular, he stresses
that his argument is ‘internal to democratic theory’16 and that therefore other
justifications for the practice of border control might apply. Likewise, he admits that,
for instance, his assumption of a global demos does not correspond to an empirically
existing reality.17 However, border control aims at sustaining the state’s territorial
integrity18 and the functioning of its institutional body. Its justification, then, would
have to draw, not only on democratic legitimacy, but also on the respect that state
receives from the international community and the legitimacy of the mechanisms
involved in sustaining the system of states. In other words, coercion at the state
border does constitute a case of state coercion (albeit a special case). This paper does
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not need to conclude in favor or not of border coercion. In this section, it was argued
only that border coercion is a form of coercion and that it is different from internal
coercion within a state. In what follows, it will be argued that even if border coercion
were to be justifiable, hidden border coercion is not.
HIDDEN DIMENSIONS OF STATE BORDER COERCION
It will be the object of this section to explore the concept of what has been called
‘hidden coercion’. ‘Hidden coercion’ as discussed here is hidden in two respects:
first, by its ambiguous location outside state borders; and second, by its delegation to
non-state actors who are themselves coerced by the state. Like money laundering,
hiding coercion in this way makes it difficult to track, to scrutinize, and to justify.
Having established the distinction between:
A. Internal coercion; and
B. Border coercion;
It is now useful to introduce a third dimension, one which has also been widely
discussed in theories of global justice.19 This is:
C. The coercion of one state over the persons living in other states.
Coercion can be hidden at the transitions between each of these dimensions: between
(A) and (B); and between (B) and (C). For example, Elspeth Guild has noted that
the real ‘fortress Europe’ occurs within the European states, not at states’ borders,
that is, it is found in the preventative measures stopping people who are physically
within the state’s borders (no longer affected by (B)) from entry into the community
of the state (unable to enter the community officially affected by (A)).20
Another type of hidden coercion that can be ambiguously located is in the various
forms of non-entry measures. That is, stopping persons who are leaving their states
(leaving (C)), from reaching the border of another state (unable to access (B)). This
paper focuses on one form of non-entry measure, known as ‘carrier sanctions’ which
puts pressure upon transport carrier companies not to transport certain persons
whom they suspect of breaking a state’s immigration rules and regulations, forcing
private transport operators to facilitate the return of any immigration-rule-breakers
that they carry. There are also many other forms of non-entry measures, including
those carried out by state officials, those that are delegated, and more ambiguous
measures. This includes the placing of border guards in third countries or enlisting
the help of border control guards in ‘buffer states’. It also involves the use of various
data collection and management measures, including those carried out by private
companies. This can even include measures such as those adopted by the US,
European countries, and others, of requiring carrier companies to provide passenger
data ahead of arrival. This development is also interesting in another respect, as it
uses the fact that private companies can operate in other countries to collect data that
would not otherwise be available to immigration officials.21 With some of these
measures, and particularly carrier sanctions, it is not clear exactly where the border
control is physically taking place.
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With Guiraudon and Lahav, one can observe a three-way shift in the devolution of
decision making in the entry of immigrants away from the state level:
1. Upwards (to intergovernmental fora);
2. Downwards (to local elected authorities); and
3. Outwards (to private actors, such as airlines, and also to other countries).22
Legitimacy of border coercion is usually only considered with regard to the action
of a state. However, when the coercion is delegated in these ways, it becomes more
difficult to apply traditional theorizing. Coercion at the border is now increasingly
delegated by states to private actors.23 Consider the companies, Worldbridge, VFS,
Gerry’s and G4S, for example. Visa applications to the UK, Australia, and Germany
may be made through Worldbridge.24 Meanwhile, VFS Global, working in the area
of visa biometric testing, has 41 client governments, and has processed over 55
million visa applications.25 Gerry’s International supports visa applications to 14
different countries made from Pakistan, and26 G4S supports the securing of ports,
airports, and other immigration facilities.27 In Australia and the UK, immigration
detention centers are staffed by Serco28 and Reliance, and other private operators.
This paper focuses on a third type of delegation, this time to transport carriers. This
paper argues that this form of delegation is particularly problematic because both the
coercive action and the decision-making are hidden (note that the coercion in the
other forms of delegation can also often contain hidden elements of a sort that will
not be discussed here).
CARRIER SANCTIONS
Carrier sanctions, which will be discussed as an example of hidden coercion in this
section, represent the situation where a state imposes sanctions in the form of fines
(or in some cases lost landing privileges), alongside the assumption of responsibility
for accommodating and repatriating migrants without papers, or with incorrect
papers, upon airlines and shipping companies,29 and land transport companies.30 In
such a situation, the coercion that is usually carried out by the state at its border is
shifted to private companies operating on the territory of another state. However,
these companies are also, indirectly, charged with setting conditions of entry, as they
must second-guess which persons they will be required to return, thus making the
conditions of entry narrower than those officially set by the state.
The sanctioning of shipping and airline companies has been around for a while.
Already in 1793, Britain required the masters of vessels to declare information about
certain foreigners or face a fine,31 while America’s 1902 Passenger Act began more
closely to resemble the sort of carrier sanctions under discussion here.32 The
contemporary version of carrier sanctions developed from the late 1970s, and
appeared in many more countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. The contemporary
trend began in Germany, Belgium, and the UK all introduced Carrier Sanctions in
1987.33 In the UK, the 1987 Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act introduced a fine
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of £1,000 per passenger lacking valid travel documents upon the transport operator
bringing them into the country.34 In the 1980s and 1990s, the law was strictly
applied, with 3,921 demands in 1987, 4,211 in 1988, 6,337 demands in 1989, and
4,431 in 1990. Indeed, between March 1987 and October 1997, fines totaling £89
million were imposed on airlines and shipping companies.35
The developments in the 1980s and 1990s led to much public and academic
debate on the practice, which has since petered out. Despite this, the practical, legal
and normative problems with the policy have not been resolved, and the imposition
of carrier sanctions is still going strong.36 The establishment of databases with
passenger records, such as the US Adaptive Passenger Information System, or the
EU Passenger Name Record, following the attacks on September 11, 2001 underline
this. Each of these types of problem will be considered in turn.
In a practical sense, the imposition of carrier sanctions leads to a situation which
fulfills the definition of coercion developed above, where the coercer is the state and
the coercee is the carrier company and only indirectly the actions of the potential
migrants are coercively altered. That is, there are at least two levels at which coercion
takes place: that between the state and the carrier and that between the carrier and
the would-be-immigrant. The state makes the carrier take mandatory action, where
mandatory action is defined to be a situation in which a third party is required by law
to undertake certain actions in the advancement of law enforcement. It is often the
responsibility of airline staff to check paperwork themselves, putting insufficiently
trained personnel in a situation of having to perform specialist roles. That said, the
current system of carrier sanctions is supported by training from the International
Air Transport Association.37 It is easiest to see the problematic nature of the measure
by examining the resulting situation for particularly vulnerable migrants.
Irrespective of information problems, this delegation of the decision-making
process forces airlines to carry the risk, and to decide how to offset humanitarian
and economic concerns (for example, when deciding whether to transport a person
presenting humanitarian need, at the risk of penalty if the state does not then
recognize their humanitarian status). Indeed, as Erika Feller has noted, ‘A high risk-
taking and profit-oriented transport carrier cannot reasonably be expected to make
humanitarian decisions based only on a possibility that sanctions will later be waived
[if the person’s case is found to be humanitarian], particularly where the burden of
proof is on the carrier’.38 This leads to a legal problem, to be discussed below.
In some cases, such as for migration to the Netherlands, and in some cases, to
Belgium, and the UK, for example, Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) check the
documents and ‘advise’ airlines, though ‘the final decision whether or not to carry a
passenger lies with the airlines’,39 forcing private companies to assume responsibility
for difficult decisions. For example, in 2004, in over 99% of Dutch cases, the advice
of ILOs was followed by the airlines.40 This relocation of responsibility and decision-
making is also problematic for what Bas Schotel calls ‘normal migrants’ as, even if
state border coercion were to be justifiable to them, in this case, the state is not taking
the responsibility for its decision to exclude.
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Today, a Travel Information Manual, maintained by the International Air Trans-
port Association, and 14 of its member airlines, provides information on carrier
sanctions, visas, and other entry requirements around the world.41 And although the
UK Home Office, for example, holds that airline staff are not expected to ‘act as
immigration officers’, and are required only to ‘check papers rather than persons’,
this does not remove the practical problem that the use of carrier sanctions means
that in effect, ‘those persons who are required to carry out controls (i.e. the personnel
of transport companies) are neither qualified nor permitted to take into account the
human rights obligations of the Member States.’42 Indeed, carriers are forced to take
financial responsibility, not only for the humanitarian decisions that will be discussed
below, but also for passengers that destroy papers whilst in transit, or for recognizing
forgeries.
The most obvious practical problems with the imposition of carrier sanctions
relate to the effect that such measures have upon the asylum system. This can be seen
best by considering the international legal situation. A person can usually only seek
asylum in a state once on its territory. However, carrier sanctions, by preventing
travel by those with suspect travel documents, will have the most significant effect
precisely upon those moving under emergency conditions. This is because, as
stated in a UNHCR position document, ‘in view of visa regulations, many persons
seeking protection are compelled to enter the EU [or any state] in an irregular
manner’.43 This means that a state can, in effect, engage in refoulement without the
problematic implications in international law, as will be explained in the following
paragraphs.
There are three main legal instruments which are important to consider in the
discussion of carrier sanctions, as they are currently enacted in several states. These
are: the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation; the 1951 Refugee Convention,
and its 1967 Protocol; and the Acquis on Article 26 of the Schengen Implementa-
tion Agreement (this only affects those European states party to the Schengen
Agreement).
The 1944 Chicago Convention is sometimes seen as the instrument allowing states
to impose carrier sanctions in the first place. This derives from two articles in the
Convention:
Article 13: The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission
to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, such as
regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and
quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or
cargo upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that
State.
Article 29: Every aircraft of a contracting State, engaged in international
navigation, shall carry the following documents in conformity with the conditions
prescribed in this Convention: . . . (f) If it carries passengers, a list of their names
and places of embarkation and destination;
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Despite the apparently clear nature of the wording of the Convention, there is debate
as to whether Article 13 imposes an obligation upon the carrier to enforce visa
requirements, or whether it merely puts this requirement upon individual passen-
gers.44 Since the Chicago Convention came into effect, this question has been
complicated by the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which constrains the
sorts of regulations a state may impose upon entry in the first place. Two paragraphs
are of particular interest:
Article 31 (1): The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are
present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.
Article 33 (1): No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘‘refouler’’) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
The penalties of carrier sanctions are not imposed upon those seeking asylum
themselves, but upon the carriers bringing them, and the state is not itself performing
the refoulement. Still, carrier sanctions can come into conflict with Article 31(1)
(see the discussion of the Schengen Implementation Agreement, below). Meanwhile,
the swift removals that constitute part of the practice of carrier sanctions, and the de
facto refoulement that takes place on behalf of the state both conflict with Article
33(1).45
Article 26 of the Schengen Implementation Agreement, which arose in the 1990s,
emphasized that sanctions must be in accordance with the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol. In response to this, some states waive the fine on the carrier, if that
person enters the asylum procedure (irrespective of the outcome of the latter).
However, some states like Germany, Denmark or the UK do not do this in the case
that humanitarian status is not granted.46 It is not obvious that this charging of fees
contravenes the letter of the 1951 Convention Article 31(1), yet it seems clear that it
contravenes the spirit of it.
It is states that are signatories to these agreements, rather than private companies,
so it could be argued that this delegation of decision making and action puts the
resulting non-admission of migrants outside the remit of these Conventions. In the
case of carrier sanctions, however, although the decision to exclude someone from
the state is not made directly by the state authorities, and the relevant legal instru-
ments discussed above address states and state action, there is an argument under
international law that a state imposing carrier sanctions still acts unlawfully. The
argument is that it fails to meet its obligations, because of both the intention found in
the implementation of carrier sanctions and the responsibility of the state to protect
Examining hidden coercion at state borders
73
(rather than just respect as in the case of private enterprises) human rights.47 Some
commentators have noted that:
By preventing migration at the source and therefore making sure that would-be
asylum-seekers do not reach the territory of receiving countries, governments no
longer have to refuse possible asylum-seekers and other migrants at the border.
They no longer need to expel failed asylum claimants  with the risk of violating the
prohibition against refoulement  they simply make sure they cannot reach the
border.48
However, carrier companies in fact also carry out refoulement,49 making the situation
even more legally problematic.
Further, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is particularly
concerned by ‘all measures applied by a state, outside its national territory, in order
to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required
documentation crossing international borders by land air or sea, and making their
way to the country of prospective destination’,50 as this will contravene the 1951
Convention. Carrier sanctions do more than this, as they in effect reduce entry
further than is required by national law. This is because, if private companies are
going to be heavily sanctioned for bringing in persons with incorrect paperwork, they
are incentivized to err on the side of caution when checking documentation.
It is necessary to note that carrier sanctions have been seen as positive by some
legal scholars, for their potential contribution to reducing trafficking. For example,
the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime endorses carrier sanctions as a way to prevent
trafficking offenses.51 Article 11 of this act requires (in paragraph 2) that states should
adopt measures aimed at removing potential means of transport for trafficking.
Explicitly included in this are measures affecting commercial carriers. The act goes
on:
3. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable international conven-
tions, such measures shall include establishing the obligation of commercial
carriers, including any transportation company or the owner or operator of any
means of transport, to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the travel
documents required for entry into the receiving state.
4. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with its
domestic law, to provide for sanctions in case of violation of the obligation set forth
in paragraph 3 of this article.
It is important to recall that, while carrier sanctions may help in the struggle
against harmful trafficking activities, they are at the same time intercepting those
who may use people smugglers as the only means to escape dangerous conditions.52
This narrowing of options is imposed by the proliferation, for example, of the
sort of pre-entry measures described in this paper. Carrier sanctions are a blunt
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instrument and both practically and normatively inappropriate as a means to save
people from dangerous trafficking relationships53 (denying the possibility of move-
ment for all in order possibly to save a minority from traffickers). Indeed, it can be
argued that the use of measures like carrier sanctions even increases the market
available for trafficking enterprises, as it reduces the available safe ways to make such
journeys.54
Thus far, the power relations involved in carrier sanctions have been too
simplistically portrayed. Indeed, Janet Gilboy characterizes carrier sanctions as a
quid pro quo, arguing that state enforcers actually have comparatively little leverage.55
As a result, she claims, ‘agency officials may be particularly dependent on private
enterprise to accomplish government goals’.56 For instance, state officials, keen to
avoid detaining individuals (as this leads to more drawn-out investigations and
decision changes), need airlines to cooperate to ensure swift removal. This reflects
another potential accountability problem, as not only is state coercion hidden, but
also modes in which states are themselves subjected to coercion are obscured.
Indeed, the situation is more complex than this, with interests sometimes hard to
trace in the relationship between carriers, states, as well as security companies and
airport authorities. The situation is, indeed, even further complicated by the fact that
the directors of these departments and companies may move between roles and
private companies in the form of carriers, airports and other privatized migration
control sectors have powerful political lobbies and interests.57
Coercion on both sides, this does not negate the problem of the hidden state
coercion. If anything, it makes it worse. Frances Nicholson, for example, refers to an
interview with a Nigerian Airways official, who, after being required to pay hefty
outstanding fines in the UK, described it as regrettable but unavoidable if the airline
wants to continue to fly to the UK.58 More research would be needed to establish, on
a practical level, how the power relations play out, but in any case, the normative
justificatory problems raised here remain.
It could be argued that the imposition of carrier sanctions is just an example of
one of the common constraints imposed on major multinational corporations, like
other fines and taxes. However, this does not take into account the particular affects
of carrier sanctions on migration, and on the human rights of migrants and would-
be-migrants, and emergency migrants in particular. In 1990, four major airlines
(Lufthansa, Swissair, Iberia and Alitalia) refused to pay the fines levied against
them by the UK government, on the grounds that they were being asked to ‘act as
immigration officers’.59 The British Home Office responded that if the airlines did
not pay, they may lose their landing rights.60 This is clearly an attempt to coerce in
some form, as described earlier in this article, irrespective of the wider nature of the
relationship, and the coercion is related to the border. However, the coercion is not
explicitly directed by the state towards the potential migrants, but hidden through
other coercee/coercer relationships. For this reason also it should be seen as ‘hidden
coercion’ and analyzed as such.
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HIDDEN COERCION AND THE LIBERALDEMOCRATIC
JUSTIFICATION OF BORDER CONTROL
With the adoption of carrier sanctions the coercion is hidden in two key ways. It is
delegated to private agents, and it is moved beyond the state borders. When the
coercion is so-hidden, this reinforces the problems of legitimacy discussed in State
Border Coercion section. To see this, problems will now be considered both with
regard to the liberaldemocratic approach generally and with regard to Abizadeh’s
and Miller’s positions respectively.
As we have seen above, the liberal problem with coercion is that it violates
individual freedom and autonomy. If, therefore, coercion is to be used by a political
system self-defining as liberal, it must be justified with regard to these values of
autonomy and freedom in order to be legitimate. This is achieved by assuring that
the coerced are also the authors of coercion.61 The above discussion, particularly of
Abizadeh’s arguments, has shown that this justification can no longer be upheld
when it comes to border coercion.62
In the case of hidden coercion, the normative challenges are even higher. This has
to do first with the lack of transparency and second with a lack of control. First, in
order to be able to justify a certain practice and thereby to render it legitimate, this
practice must be sufficiently transparent and public. Transparency, however, is lost
in the practice of hidden coercion in that it is moved into a gray area that is largely
invisible to the demos. This occurs in two ways. The first way in which a policy like
carrier sanctions hides the coercion is that the true meaning of the policy-making
by the state is obscured because the policy is drafted in a context where it will
necessarily be reinterpreted by non-state actors in the process of its enforcement.
That is, for example, if a state makes clear that it will accept all those with level of
proof of a humanitarian claim to protection X, and most of those with level of proof
Y, then the private company with tight profit margins will be incentivised to refuse
those who only have level of proof Y, for fear of sanction, and accept most of those
with level of proof X. The second way in which a policy like carrier sanctions hides
the coercion is that there are, in effect, two levels of coercees. The intended coercee
at the border is the potential migrant, however the state channels this through the
carrier companies, so that the state only indirectly engages in the border coercion.
Second, the delegation to private actors removes coercion from democratic as well
as legalconstitutional control mechanisms. Coercion exercised by state actors, be it
within the territory of the state or at the state borders, meanwhile, is usually subject
to relevant control mechanisms such as judicial review and is bound by rule of
law principles. This is shown, for example, in the analysis of the international legal
documents regulating the practice of carrier sanctions. This analysis is useful, both
because it shows the state of affairs in the real world, an understanding of which will
enable real-world normative theorizing in this area to develop, and because it reflects
the liberal norm that the coercion of the state should be subject to such control
mechanisms in order to be legitimate. Moreover, public actors underlie democratic
control. Private actors, such as airlines, by contrast, are not subjected to the same
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legal regime, nor can they be controlled democratically. Hidden coercion, therefore,
is not only not justifiable to those persons subject to it (as it was the case with
traditional border coercion), but is also no longer justifiable by any legaldemocratic
means at hand.
It was stated above that there are some justifications that potentially apply to
border coercion and which draw on considerations of sovereignty and the integrity of
the state. These justifications fail with regard to hidden coercion for two reasons.
First, it is doubtful whether there could already be a threat to sovereignty when the
borders of the country are not reached. Second, it is problematic since at the hidden
border, private actors are endowed with the power of border control, while the
justifications offered are for states (and state actors) and their institutional role.
On this basis, one can return to the debate between Abizadeh and Miller. This
paper’s analysis of the practice of hidden coercion alters the assessment of Abizadeh
and Miller’s arguments. In particular, it demonstrates that, in the case of hidden
coercion, Abizadeh’s criticism that border coercion is incompatible with the liberal
democratic justification is stronger, since the exercise of state coercion is particularly
problematic when removed from sight and effective control.
With regard to Miller’s arguments, some of his points can be refuted even more
strongly in the case of hidden coercion. That is, hidden borders, and in particular the
treatment of asylum-seekers, is a case against Miller’s claim that border coercion
merely is hypothetical coercion as opposed to a subjection to coercion, because
coercion only becomes actual when the border is reached. When border control
mechanisms are hidden, they are already present at stages where the actual border as
well as the intention to reach or cross it, is not yet theoretically in question.
Finally, consider a further minor remark on Miller’s distinction between coercion
and prevention. Miller argued that coercion ‘involves forcing a person to do some
relatively specific thing, while prevention ruled out one specific option only; in other
words prevention means forcing a person not to do some relatively specific thing
while leaving other options open’.63 In the light of hidden coercion, this distinction
becomes even more difficult to uphold. It has been shown above that coercion works
equally by ruling out one or a few options only or by making some options highly
unattractive. Practices of hidden coercion support this in that disallowing a person to
board a plane technically prevents that person from taking one route only, namely
that single flight, but practically precludes various ensuing options such as applying
for asylum. With this additional aspect of precluding important prospective options
by prohibiting one minor one at an earlier stage, hidden coercion can even be said to
make use of the (according to some) seemingly less harmful mode of prevention to
exert what it is in fact border coercion on would-be-immigrants.
CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced the notion of ‘hidden coercion’ to refer to an obscured
form of state border coercion. Through the example of carrier sanctions, it has demon-
strated two ways in which border coercion can be obscured (through delegation to
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other actors, and through moving the location of the coercive activity beyond the
state borders). Hiding coercion in these ways poses problems for the liberal
democratic view presented and discussed above. Crucially, it becomes difficult to
identify the role of the state in the coercion. The problem raised here is not so much,
then, that private individuals are involved in migration control functions per se but
that the state’s role is thereby obscured. This is stated most bleakly by Tally
Kritzman-Amir:
While carriers are threatened with sanctions if they err and allow entry to
undocumented migrants, they are not subject to any sanctions if they effectively
deny entry and admission of asylum seekers. There are thus incentives to err on the
side of caution which in this case means to refuse to transport asylum seekers who
wish to enter clandestinely.64
The state is able to hide the nature of the border coercion through the coercion of
another sort levied against private carriers. Indeed, the levels of delegation are
usually more complex than there was scope to detail here. As both the force and the
decision making in border coercion is delegated and delegated again it becomes
difficult to trace the border coercion itself and the state’s role in it.
Although this is normatively problematic whoever the migrants are, it becomes
particularly legally and practically problematic in the case of asylum. This is because,
though there are differences of understanding about the function of the Refugee
Convention at the border (before refugee status is acknowledged), asylum seekers
represent a group theoretically legally entitled to contravene state border rules (even
closed-border theorists like Michael Walzer allow this65). However, carrier sanctions
mean that, without a refusing state officially making a decision either way, such per-
sons are prevented from entering and are also returned to situations of persecution.
This is legally problematic, as refoulement in fact takes place. It is practically pro-
blematic because of the threat to life it causes, the pressure put on untrained indi-
viduals to make immigration decisions, and the difficulty of tracing the responsibility
for those decisions. Importantly, it is also normatively problematic and difficult to
justify, as the relationships between the various coercers and coercees are obscured.
Analyzing the legal and practical problems involved here has made it possible to
locate this problem and to recognize its urgency.
State border coercion is becoming increasingly hidden. It is being ambiguously
located, particularly through pre-entry posts and checks, and it is being delegated,
sometimes through complex networks. Hiding the coercion in this way, as has been
argued, is deeply problematic, yet surprisingly, it is given only little attention in the
literature. The problem of hidden state border coercion raises difficulties for
coercion theory, and sets up a problem for those justifying border control in general.
Moreover, this paper has presented that hidden border coercion measures like carrier
sanctions are in fact problematic for international law and endanger the lives of
certain migrants. Thus, as well as a troubling theoretical difficulty, the growing
phenomenon of unjustifiable hidden state border coercion is of urgent practical
concern that will be best addressed by understanding its normative problematic.
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